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Abstract
Deviant tourist behavior not only has direct influences 
on management cost of organization, but related to 
travel perception of tourists. Existing related researches 
consider less the evolution of deviant behavior. The article 
proposes a decision-making rule of deviant behavior 
which makes tourists as decision subjects and develops 
the evolution model of deviant tourist behavior. Then, the 
evolution simulation of deviant tourist behavior based 
on dual-agent is implemented using NetLogo simulation 
platform and the simulation experiment which is aimed at 
studing the influence of manager density and conformity 
preference on deviant tourist behavior, which reveals 
strategies of optimizing the evolution result of deviant 
behavior. By simulation experiment, we show that herd 
behavior characteristic of attractions for tourists could 
promote the consistency of group civilized behavior, and 
setting attractions manager density at 4% reasonably could 
contain large-scale outbreak of deviant tourist behavior.
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INTRODUCTION
Tourism activity affects destinations in many ways: 
economically, socially and environmentally (Ganglmair-
Wooliscroft & Wooliscroft, 2016). The tourism industry 
is an essential economic sector for developing and 
developed countries, with more and more domestic 
and internatinal tourists. Deviant tourism behavior 
has range of well-documented negative environmental 
consequences. Few governments take regulatory action 
to prevent such negative effects, possibly because it may 
reduce tourism demand, and simultaneously tourism 
revenues (Juvan & Sara, 2016). Meanwhile, Consumers 
have also an increasing interest in behaviour of civilized 
traveling. Tourists can help to reduce this negative impact 
by making environmentally sustainable vacation decisions 
and behaving in an environmentally sustainable manner 
while at the destination (Ibid.). 
The phenomenon of deviant tourist behavior involves 
practices undertaken in a tourism-related context that 
operates at the fuzzy edge of social legitimacy or legality 
(Ryan & Kinder, 1996). The exsiting researches on 
deviant tourist behaviors are mainly focused on exploring 
the patterns, causes, measurement and correction of 
deviant tourist behavior (Juvan & Dolnicar, 2016). The 
empirical research on relationship between respondents’ 
social expectations tendency and environmentally 
sustainable tourists behavior found that the incidence of 
environmental sustainable tourist behavior is up to 74% 
under the condition of higher social expectation (Ibid.). 
Lin (2013), on the other hand, based on the qualitative 
analysis method and the object of Chinese southern 
minority nationalities, draws the conclusion of humanistic 
quality’s effect on the phenomenon of deviant tourism 
behavior. Ganglmair-Wooliscroft and B. Wooliscroft’s 
(2016) research establshed Rash model to link deviant 
tourist behavior and consumer innovation by virtue of 
empirical research on normal tourists sample. From the 
perspective of psychoanalysis and interview method, 
Uriely et al. (2011) suggested that different tourism and 
tourism activities will spur deviant tourism behavior 
unconsciously. From the perspective of marketing, Brunt 
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and Brophy (2004) discussed the relevance with deviant 
tourist behavior level and resort’s marketing ways through 
empirical research, found that some marketing means 
repeatedly involved parties, stimulating nightlife, and 
relaxed atmosphere will lead to more deviant behavior, 
even criminal behavior. Combined with the moral 
development of theory, Li (2015) supposed a framework 
of deviant tourist behavior and theoretically elaborated 
causes of deviant behavior from individual, others, groups 
and society, and this research found bad habits and the 
destruction for tourism resources or equipments is the 
main form of deviant behavior. Majority of literature has 
not explained how the tourists’ deviant behavior evolves 
and how to change the evolution results. Therefore, this 
research establishes a decision-making model of deviant 
tourist behavior, constructs the evolution model of deviant 
tourist behavior by using Agent simulation modeling 
technology, and studies the strategies of optimal evolution 
results.
By lab experiments, Kirchler et al. (2016) have 
verified that threat of punishment could improve the 
moral level. This means that during the evolution process 
of deviant tourist behavior, the role of scenic spot 
managers on supervision and punishment over tourists 
should not be ignored. On the other hand, the individual, 
as a member of group, has a very strong inclination to 
follow and imitate others. Therefore this paper takes the 
difference characteristic of conformity preferences as 
well as the complex interactions between tourists and 
scenic spot managers into consideration, and utilizes 
simulation modeling software, NetLogo simulation 
platform to construct the simulation model of deviant 
tourist behavior evolution. This model is based on two 
kinds of agents, scenic spot tourists and managers. And 
due to difference characteristic of tourist, it divides the 
tourists into three types of agents according to conformity 
preferences. The individual will conduct self-decisions 
by following other individuals within his view according 
to conformity preferences and commit self-adjustment 
and self-improvement according to density distribution of 
scenic spot managers and frequency of punishment. This 
research is aimed at exploring the influences of density 
proportion of scenic spot managers and conformity 
preferences of tourists on deviant tourists quantities at 
the end of simulation, simulating the behavior of double-
intelligent agents, tourists and managers and their 
interactions, constructing the simulation model of deviant 
tourist behavior evolution, and analyzing and simulating 
the optimization of experimental results to reveal the 
strategy of optimizing deviant behavior evolution results. 
1. BEHAVIOR RULES
The evolution model of deviant tourist behavior built by 
this paper takes the scenic spot as a complete complex 
system, and the scenic spot includes two kinds of 
agents, tourists and managers. The tourists could choose 
to conduct not-deviant behavior or deviant behavior 
according to decision resources of tourists themselves 
and decision rules. Tourists will make judgments about 
whether they conduct deviant behavior or not based on 
whether the difference between expected utility and 
expected cost of conducting deviant behavior is greater 
than behavior threshold value T or not. Expected utility is 
composed of behavior motivation and civilized awareness 
of the tourists which refer to the measurement of the 
agent (scenic spot tourist) to satisfy his need through 
deviant behavior. For example, the tourists satisfy their 
convenience need by damaging environmental health and 
satisfy their vanity need through carving and painting on 
facilities. Expected cost is made up of probability of being 
caught and reputation cost, and refers to the measurement 
of the cost brought by deviant behavior. Interim 
procedures for managing the records of deviant tourist 
behavior stipulates, if necessary, records of deviant tourist 
behavior should be reported to public security, customs, 
immigration inspection, transportation and people’s 
bank credit investigation institutions, which undoubtedly 
increase the reputation and moral cost of deviant tourist 
behavior. 
Behavior motivation means the interior driving forces 
that cause behavioral agent to conduct deviant behavior 
and wishes and intentions that cause the agent to conduct 
deviant behavior in specific environment of the scenic 
spot. The larger an agent’s behavior motivation is, the 
larger his expectation and driving force to cause him to 
conduct deviant behavior are. And it is easier for him to 
decide to conduct deviant behavior. 
Civilized awareness is tourists’ knowledge about their 
deviant behavior, that is their understanding of definition, 
punishment, importance and necessity of deviant behavior. 
With stronger civilized awareness, it means stronger wish 
and habituation to conduct civilized behavior, and it is 
easier for him to decide to conduct civilizd behavior. 
Reputation cost is reputation loss cost caused by agent 
deviant behavior generated by reputation mechanism 
covered by laws and regulations. It could constrain the 
opportunistic behavior of an agent to some extent. The 
higher an agent’s reputation cost is, the stronger the 
constraint that causes this agent to conduct not-deviant 
behavior is. And it is easier for this agent to decide to 
conduct civilizd behavior. 
The probability of being caught is the probability of 
supervising and punishing tourists who are conducting 
deviant behavior produced by the obligation of scenic spot 
managers to supervise and punish deviant tourist behavior. 
The probability of being caught is judged through the 
ratio between managers and tourists in the surrounding 
environment. That this ratio is very high indicates the 
higher probability of being caught and stronger constraint 
and vice versa.
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Behavior Rules for Tourists 
Scenic spot managers play the role of supervising and 
punishing the deviant behavior of tourists. They could 
immediately arrest and punish tourists who are conducting 
deviant behavior within their visible range, which has an 
impact on the probability of being caught, so as to increase 
the expected cost of tourists for their deviant behavior 
and limit their deviant behavior. This paper also takes 
into consideration difference characteristic of conformity 
preferences of individuals and divides tourists into 
different attributes according to conformity preferences: 
independent type, adaptive type and conformity type. 
Tourists of conformity type only make judgments about 
whether they choose to conduct deviant behavior or not 
according to conformity value, that is, the choice of most 
of tourists in the neighborhood. There are interactions 
between scenic spot tourists and managers in the system 
of a scenic spot and not-deviant and deviant behaviors 
evolve under the rules of decision to finally constitute the 
evolution model of deviant tourist behavior.
2. MODEL BUILDING
Two assumptions are given before building the model:
Assumption a behavior decisions of other individuals 
are observable in the system of a scenic spot. 
Assumption b in the system of a scenic spot, different 
behavioral agents have different resources which have 
heterogeneity. 
A complex system is a system generated by agents 
with different goals and capabilities and interactions 
among these agents. Emerging behavior of a complex 
system is determined by several factors, including agent 
behavior, evolution rules, agent interaction network and 
available information structure of agents (Tsai, 2013). 
Therefore the model built by this paper takes a scenic 
spot as a complete complex system, and tourists and 
managers contained in this scenic spot are two kinds 
of individuals. Evolution of individual behavior, and 
interactions and relations among individuals constitute 
the development of this whole system. This paper, 
through construction of evolution model of deviant 
tourist behavior, analyzes the decision choice of a single 
tourist agent between not-deviant and deviant behavior 
under the addition of scenic spot managers, and then 
makes a summary of tourists who belong to the same 
behavior status in accordance with decision situation 
of agents, and analyzes the respective number of not-
deviant tourists and deviant tourists included in this 
whole system, so as to study on evolution of deviant 
tourist behavior and strategy of optimizing evolution 
results. Decision analysis starts from individual decision 
whose logical basis is to construct a frame model based 
on expected utility theory to analyze the decision choice 
of each individual (Kirchler et al., 2016). Therefore, 
this paper, from the perspective of tourists’ decisions of 
conducting not-deviant behavior or deviant behavior, 
evaluates whether tourists will conduct deviant behavior 
or not based on difference value between expected utility 
value and expected cost value, to finally obtain deviant 
behavior level of the whole system. Because avoidable 
supervision is easier to cause deviant behavior, power 
given to the supervised to influence supervision will 
encourage people to conduct deviant behavior (Chick & 
Gans, 2009). Therefore, tourists and managers involved 
in the model of this paper do not have any overlap 
relation. The model supposes that scenic spot managers 
are selfless, and they are not influenced by the tourists to 
indulge their deviant behavior. 
Based on above assumptions and definitions, deviant 
tourist behavior decision model formula is as follows: 
  ( , , , , )r rf V L U N F= . (1)
Decisions made by tourists to conduct deviant behavior 
are determined by five variables, namely, the systematic 
environment of the whole scenic spot, tourists themselves, 
managers, and evolution rules, in which f is evolution 
model; Vr is tourists of a scenic spot; Lr is the whole 
system of this scenic spot which is a complex system 
composed of all agents in this scenic spot; U is scenic spot 
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managers; N is Moore neighborhood; F is evolution rules 
that do not take into consideration other agent factors 
within Moore neighborhood. The results of F are only two 
kinds, not-deviant behavior or deviant behavior. Whether 
tourists would choose to conduct deviant behavior or not 
is determined by the difference between expected utility 
and expected cost, based on the description of the above 
decision model, which is denoted as:
 
 ,  
,  
l
h
V if EU EC T
F
V if EU EC T
 − >
= 
− ≤
 . (2)
In which, Vl denotes that the evolution result of 
agent behavior is deviant behavior and correspondingly, 
Vh denotes that the result of evolution result of agent 
behavior is not-deviant behavior. T is behavior threshold 
value of man-made setting, T =0.1. Take a scenic spot 
as a system, and use the evolution model formula of 
deviant tourist behavior to evaluate behavior decision of 
each tourist agent, then deviant level of this scenic spot 
could be calculated by the ratio between the total number 
of deviant tourists and the total number of not-deviant 
tourists and deviant tourists. Deviant level of a scenic spot 
is denoted as ω:
  
 n
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Each agent is a behavior decision-maker, and his 
decisions are influenced not only by his own decision-
making factors, but also behaviors of other decision-
makers in surrounding him. A part of behavior agents will 
give up their own decisions and choose to be consistent 
with group selection under the influence of the decisions 
of surrounding groups. This is a kind of conformity 
behavior. Because conformity preference degree of each 
tourist is different, the tourists could be divided into three 
types, independent type, adaptive type and conformity 
type in accordance with conformity preferences which 
are respectively represented Vi,S1,Vi,S2 and Vi,S3. This model 
considers the corresponding evolution rule agents for each 
type agents. 
(a) Independent tourist 
Independent type denotes that in decision model 
formula, f(V,Li,U,N,F), tourists of this type are not 
affected by N, namely the influence of behavior decisions 
of tourists in the surrounding neighborhood. They only 
follow their own evolution rule to determine whether to 
conduct deviant behavior or not. The evolution rule for 
deviant behavior of independent tourists Vi,S1 is:
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(b) Adaptive tourists
Whether an adaptive tourist decides to conduct deviant 
behavior or not is determined not only by F, but also by 
N. He may choose behavior based on evolution rule F, or 
behavior decisions of most tourists surrounding him, or 
the combination of the two factors. It depends whether 
decision of an agent is contained in decision set within N. 
Deviant behavior evolution rule for independent tourists 
Vi,S2 is:
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In which Y*(V tiL) represents the mode of decision set 
within neighborhood N. 
(c) Conformity tourists
In the decision model formula f=(Vi,Li,U,N,F), 
conformity tourists are bot affected by F and they 
only follow behavior decisions of most tourists in the 
surrounding neighborhood to determine whether to 
conduct deviant behavior or not. If most tourists in the 
surrounding neighborhood (set as over half tourists) 
choose to conduct deviant behavior, tourists of this type 
will also decide to conduct deviant behavior and vice 
versa. The deviant behavior evolution rule for conformity 
tourists Vi,S3 is:
   
3
1 *
,( ) ( )
t t
i S iLf V Y V
+ =  . (6)
3. SIMULATION EXPERIMENT
3.1 Simulation Agents
Simulation technology based on computer is able to help 
managers to understand more organization processes 
through less training cost and also gives accurate 
solutions for organization improvement (J. Mayfield & M. 
Mayfield, 2013). Simulation method is commonly suitable 
for studies on complex systems in whose simulation 
models acquisition cost of optimum estimated values 
is very expensive (Chen & Fu, 2008). The basic task 
of the simulation study is to find out a set of systematic 
decision variables that could maximize or minimize the 
measurement standard of expected goal (Keeney, 2016). 
In consideration of complexity of the environment of the 
scenic spot, higher cost for changing the ratio of managers 
and big difficulty in controlling tourists, this paper adopts 
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simulation modeling method based on agents. Simulation 
modeling method based on agents can attach great 
importance not only to agents of the individual system, 
but also to interactions among agents (J. Mayfield & M. 
Mayfield, 2013). The deviant tourist behavior evolution 
model built by this paper is based on two kinds of 
intelligent agents, tourists and managers, and divides and 
defines agents according to individual differences into 
independent tourists, adaptive tourists and conformity 
tourists (Yang, 2009). 
Agent
Tourist
Manager
Independent tourists
Adaptive tourists
Conformity tourists
Figure 2
The Simulation Subject
3.2 Simulation Evolution Algorithm
Suppose that each agent has some learning ability, and 
these agents usually could realize the dynamic adaptation 
to the environment base on their judgments about 
surrounding environment and by decision adjustments 
through learning mechanisms. There are two methods 
to achieve decision adjustments: reactive reinforcement 
learning and anticipatory reinforcement learning. In this 
model, through anticipatory reinforcement learning, an 
agent (a tourist) could predict his behavior consequence 
so as to choose the optimal action, adjust his decision and 
choose the next decision behavior on the basis of situation 
of scenic spot managers of the current surrounding 
environment.
Before behavior evolution of each agent, we need to 
define the attributes of agents at the first step. Different 
agent attributes correspond to different evolution rules, 
and accordingly show different decision choices. The 
agents have two kinds of decisions: not-deviant behavior 
or deviant behavior. For Agent of the same category, 
their choices of different decisions will produce different 
behaviors, which will have impacts on the deviant level 
of the scenic spot. Therefore, here is the agent behavior 
evolution model as shown in Figure 3. 
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Civilized 
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Figure 3
Behavior Evolution Model of Tourists
The expected utility is described by behavior 
motivation and civilized awareness:
  EU=M(1-A). (7)
The expected cost is measured through the probability 
of being caught and reputation cost:
  EC=P×C. (8)
Besides the probability of being caught is related to 
the ratio between scenic spot managers U and tourists V 
in Moore neighborhood. It is expressed by exponential 
function:
  P=1-e[-k(Un/Vn)v]. (9)
In which k value is a constant that guarantees the 
rationality of p value. Subscript V denotes the maximum 
integer that is less than or equal to this figure. CV denotes 
the ratio between total number of deviant tourists and 
total number of tourists in Moore neighborhood, namely 
the mode of decision set of other decision-makers in 
neighborhood.
3.3 Parameter Setting
The deviant tourist behavior evolution model is based on 
NetLogo 5.3.1 simulation platform. 
Firstly, Set the number of tourist agents of each type 
at controllable range of 0%-100% controlled by slider 
and initialize the decisive choices of agents. In simulation 
experiment 1, 2 and 3, as well as the experiment of 
civilized awareness, all agents are initialized to conduct 
not-deviant behavior. In simulation experiment 4, 5, and 6, 
in order to study the effect of conformity preferences on 
deviant behavior, we randomly set that 20% of agents are 
deviant tourists. Secondly, reputation cost and behavior 
motivation have randomness and their values are between 
0 and 1 randomly produced by simulation procedures. 
Civilized awareness is controlled by the experimenter, 
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with its value between 0% and 100%. The initial value 
of visible range k is 7 and threshold value T is set at 0.1. 
Thirdly, according to deviant tourist behavior decision 
rules, we simulate each tourist’s decision of conducting 
not-deviant behavior or deviant behavior, namely 
Vhand Vl. Based on current agent decision and decision 
adjustment rules, agents determine the optimal behavior 
that should be selected for the next phase. 
Figure 4
Simulation Interface
4. SIMULATION RESULT
For a fixed simulation with limited alternatives, the 
simulation duration of each alternative must be determined 
at first and the result of each simulation experiment must 
be given (Chick & Gans, 2009). The duration of the 
following simulation experiments is respectively 120, 200, 
and 300 clocks. This paper will give change trajectory 
graphs of the number of deviant tourists for each status 
(not-deviant, deviant and punished) and each type 
(independent, adaptive, conformity) of each experiment. 
4.1 Experimental Simulation and Analysis Under 
the Continuous Increase of Managers Density
The deviant tourist behavior evolution situation under the 
continuous increase of the managers density is explored 
by simulation experiment 1, 2, and 3, with constant 
civilized awareness, k value and density of tourists, and 
simulation duration of all simulation experiments are set 
as 120 clocks and the number of tourists is 1,009. Three 
experiments are conducted according to different densities 
of scenic spot managers to study the optimization density 
ratio of scenic spot managers which can significantly 
reduce the number of deviant tourists. The density of 
scenic spot managers V in experiment 1, 2 and 3 is 
respectively 2%, 3% and 4%. 
Table 1
Experiment Parameter Table Under Continuous Increase of Managers Density
Experiment
 parameter K
Tourists density Managers 
density
Civilized 
awarenessIndependent 
tourists
Adaptive 
tourists
Conformity 
tourists
Experiment 1 7 60% 0 0 2% 0.8
Experiment 2 7 60% 0 0 3% 0.8
Experiment 3 7 60% 0 0 4% 0.8
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Figure 7
The Curve Shows the Dynamic Curve Graphs of Tourists and Deviant Tourists for Each Status When V=4% in Experiment 3
Table 2
Descriptive Statistical Analysis of Simulation Experiments Under Continuous Increase of Managers Density
Managers density
Number of deviant tourists
Max Min Mean Std.D
0.5%
1%
2%
3%
4%
490
490
446
399
2
444
386
203
0
0
452.70
406.59
265.45
125.40
0.44
7.08
14.80
31.33
73.84
0.65
Figure 5
The Curve Shows the Dynamic Curve Graphs of Tourists 
and Deviant Tourists for Each Status When V=2% in 
Experiment 1
Figure 6
The Curve Shows the Dynamic Curve Graphs of Tourists 
and Deviant Tourists for Each Status When V=3% in 
Experiment 2 
In experiment 1 (as shown in Figure 5), deviant 
tourists quantity presents a right-skewed distribution. 
They increase and then decrease and reach the peak value 
(accounting for 44.2% of the scale of tourists) with a fast 
rate of convergence during a shorter time at the beginning. 
And finally the number of deviant tourists tends to be 
stable. From comparison among the number of not-deviant, 
deviant and punished tourists, it is found that the number 
of not-deviant tourists sharply decreases at the beginning 
while the punished tourists gradually increase. However, 
the three kinds of tourists all tend to be stable over time. 
It is easier for tourists to conduct more deviant behavior 
when the density of scenic spot managers is lower. 
WhenV is 3%, the number of deviant tourists at first 
keeps constant and later suddenly increases and reaches 
the peak value (accounting for 39.54% of the scale of the 
tourists). Then it sharply declines and finally tends to be 
stable (accounts for 14.1% of the scale of the tourists). 
The number not-deviant tourists at first keeps constant 
and then decrease. The number of punished tourists 
grows along with the growing number of deviant tourists. 
However, the three types of tourists all tend to be stable 
over time. When the managers density is at the middle 
level, deviant tourist behavior will lurk for a period of 
time and then suddenly breaks out. 
From the comparison of the results of the above 
experiments, we see that peak value of deviant tourists 
accounts for about 40% and the stable value is still greater 
than 10%. The effect is obvious. However, when V=4%, 
Figure 7 shows that the numbers of deviant tourists, not-
deviant tourists and punished tourists are all at a relatively 
stable status. Deviant behavior frequently appears at a 
very small cardinal number and peak value is only 2. The 
density of scenic spot managers at a relatively appropriate 
value (4%) can restrain the outbreak of large scale of 
deviant tourist behavior. Though deviant behavior still 
happens, the civilized level of the scenic spot has almost 
reached 100%. 
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Through statistical calculation of the number of deviant 
tourists at each unit time when the managers density is 
respectively 0.5%, 1%, 2%, 3% and 4%, we obtain Table 
2. The following conclusions can be made from Table 
2): a) when the density of scenic spot managers is ≤2%, 
the deviant tourists present a right-skewed distribution, 
and they all increase at first and then decrease and finally 
reach the stable status. And the ratio of deviant tourists is 
always lower than the ratio of not-deviant tourists. The 
lower the density of scenic spot managers is, the higher 
the peak value of deviant tourists is (namely, the larger the 
ascensional range is), and the higher the stable state value is 
(namely, the smaller the falling range is). And the number 
of punished tourists is smaller than the number of deviant 
tourists. b) When the density of scenic spot managers is  ∈
 4%V (2%, 4%), the number of deviant tourists always at first 
keeps constant and later increases and then decrease, and 
finally reach the stable status. The higher the density of 
scenic spot managers, the longer the lurking time of deviant 
tourists is. c) When the density of scenic spot is ≥4%, 
deviant tourists decrease sharply. They do not sharply rise, 
but appear at intervals by small scale. The average value is 
less than 1 person. When 
 ∈
 4%V  , the higher the density of 
scenic spot managers, the lower the occurrence frequency 
of deviant behavior is, and the smaller the number of 
deviant tourists at the same moment is. However, even 
though the ratio between scenic spot managers and tourists 
is set at 1:1, deviant behavior does occur. Therefore, 
it is not enough to completely eliminate the deviant 
tourist behavior by only depending on supervision and 
management of scenic spot managers. It also requires other 
measures. 
4.2 Experimental Simulation and Analysis Under 
Different Conformity Preferences
Experiments (experiment 4, 5, 6) are made to explore 
the influences of different conformity preferences on 
deviant tourist behavior evolution results, in which the 
initial density of deviant tourists is set as 20%, total 
density of tourists is 60%, density of initial managers is 
2%, civilized awareness is 0.8 and the number of tourist 
is 1,009. Three experiments are conducted to study the 
relation between the ratio of three kinds of conformity 
behavior and the deviant tourist behavior evolution. The 
conformity preferences of experiment 4, 5 and 6 are 
respectively  { } { } { }= 1,0,0 = 0.5,0.25,0.25 = 0,0,1φ φ φ， ， .
The simulation operates 300 duration units, and the 
simulation results are as shown in the following figures 
(the horizontal axis expresses unit time, and vertical axis 
expresses the number). 
Table 3
Simulation Experiment Parameter Under Different Conformity Preferences
Experiment
 parameter K
Tourists density
Managers 
density
Civilized 
awarenessIndependent 
tourists
Adaptive 
tourists
Conformity 
tourists
Experiment 4 7 60% 0 0 2% 0.8
Experiment 5 7 30% 15% 15% 2% 0.8
Experiment 6 7 0 0 60% 2% 0.8
Figure 8
It Shows the Dynamic Curve Graph of Tourists 
for Each Status When the Ratio Is (1,0,0) in 
Experiment 4
Figure 9
It Shows The Dynamic Curve Graph of Tourists 
For Each Status When the Ratio Is (0.5,0.25,0.25) in 
Experiment 5
30Copyright © Canadian Research & Development Center of Sciences and Cultures
Research on Analysis and Dynamic Evolution of Deviant Tourists Behavior
Figure 10
It Shows the Dynamic Curve Graph of Tourists for Each Status When the Ratio Is (0,0,1) in Experiment 5
Figure 11
Dynamic Curve Graph of Independent Deviant 
Tourists in Experiment 6
Figure 12
Dynamic Curve Graph of Adaptive Deviant Tourists 
in Experiment 6
Figure 13
Dynamic Curve Graph of Conformity Deviant Tourists in Experiment 6
Table 4 
Descriptive Statistical Analysis of Simulation Experiment Under Different Conformity Preferences
Experiment Deviant tourists Max Min Mean Std.D
Experiment 5 (1,0,0)
Independent tourists
Adaptive tourists
Conformity tourists
Total tourists
475
-
-
475
248
-
-
248
272.36
-
-
272.36
34.56
-
-
34.56
Experiment 6 (0.5,0.25,0.25)
Independent tourists
Adaptive tourists
Conformity tourists
Total tourists
237
59
50
237
0
0
0
0
42.49
0.33
0.17
42.98
58.09
3.41
2.88
58.79
Experiment 7 (0,0,1)
Independent tourists
Adaptive tourists
Conformity tourists
Total tourists
0
-
-
0
0
-
-
0
0
-
-
0
0
-
-
0
When conformity preference is  { }= 1,0,0φ  (as shown 
in Figure 8), independent deviant tourists are of right- 
skewed distribution. During the period of the first 
simulation, deviant tourists sharply increase and have 
doubled (accounting for about 40% of the total tourists). 
Later during the period of second simulation, deviant 
tourists decline to a stable level (accounting for 26.13% of 
the total tourists). Independent not-deviant tourists, during 
the period of the first simulation, sharply decrease to the 
minimum (accounting for 49.85% of the total tourists), 
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and then converge to this stable level with a fast rate of 
convergence). Independent punished tourists gradually 
increase, and keep stable after a period of time. Finally 
the three kinds of tourists reach a stable level and keep 
constant. In the group of conformity tourists, the number 
of not-deviant tourists is always greater than the number 
of deviant tourists. 
E x p e r i m e n t  5  s i m u l a t e s  t h e  c o n f o r m i t y 
preference { }= 0.5,0.25,0.25φ , and obtains the result as 
shown in figure 9. Among agents, most tourists choose 
to conduct not-deviant behavior. Not-deviant tourists, 
deviant tourists and punished tourists change by following 
certain cycle: they increase at first and then decrease, 
and finally keep constant, in which, Figures 11, 12 and 
13 are obtained through deviant tourists of different 
types. Independent deviant tourists change in cycles of 
increasing at first and then reducing with a peak value of 
outbreak and seldom appearance of one or two agents. 
Conformity deviant tourists quickly reduce to 0 and then 
change little. Adaptive tourists rapidly reduce and later 
a small number of tourists choose to conduct deviant 
behavior at intervals. 
Experiment 6 simulates extreme conformity behavior. 
In Figure 10, for conformity tourists, not-deviant tourists 
quickly increase, and deviant tourists sharply increase to 
almost 0. Punished tourists at first increase slightly and 
then reduce. After a period of time, the three kinds of 
tourists reach the stable level, in which deviant tourists 
keep 0. In this extreme situation, tourists converge very 
quickly and all choose to conduct not-deviant tourist with 
one accord. 
The following conclusions can be reached through 
comparison and analysis of the computational results 
of simulation experiment 4, 5 and 6. Firstly, deviant 
independent tourists always at first increase, and then 
decrease. They change in a cycle of increasing at first, 
and later decreasing, and finally keeping constant with 
the addition of conformity tourists. Secondly, conformity 
deviant tourists always quickly reduce to 0. The reason 
may be that a certain ratio of conformity members in 
a group will promote the consistency of the group and 
further advance the generation of optimization strategies. 
If conformity group, at the beginning, choose optimization 
behavior or behavior accepted by most people, the 
convergence rate of group decision will be obviously 
improved. Thirdly, adaptive tourists are the change of 
comprehensive independent tourists and conformity 
tourists. Forthly, Table 4 is obtained through the descriptive 
statistical analysis of the results of experiment 4, 5 and 6. 
It is found that when there are only independent tourists 
in a group, the ratio of deviant tourists fluctuates from 
24% to 47% with the average value of 272.36 (accounting 
for 26.99% of the total tourists), and the variance of 
34.5 which indicates that the number of deviant tourists 
is greater than the initial number; when there are only 
conformity tourists in a group, the ratio of deviant tourists 
is 0; when  { }= 0.5,0.25,0.25φ , the ratio of deviant tourists 
fluctuate from 0% to 23%, with the average value of 
42.98 and the standard variance of 58.79. At this time, 
the number of deviant tourists only accounts for 4.26% 
of the total tourists, but change in cycle whose maximum 
value and minimum value are very different. Therefore, 
from the variance, we can see a large fluctuation range. 
Conformity tourists will promote the consistency of group 
choice which can make the observable deviant tourist in 
real life reduce by 21%, but the fluctuation range increases 
almost 1.7 times from the standard variance. It can be 
judged that under favorable initial condition (the number 
of initial not-deviant tourists is greater than that of deviant 
tourists), a certain ratio of conformity tourists in a group 
can promote consistency of group to some extent, reduce 
deviant behavior, and further promote the generation of 
optimization strategy of civilized behavior. 
CONCLUSION
Existing related researches consider less evolution of 
deviant behavior and strategies of optimizing evolution 
results, this research proposes the simulation model of 
deviant tourist behavior based on two kinds of intelligent 
agents, scenic spot tourists and managers. This model puts 
forward the decision model and decision rules of deviant 
tourist behavior and utilize simulation modeling software, 
NetLogo simulation platform, on the basis of two kinds 
of agents, tourists and managers. Tourist are divided by 
conformity preferences into independent tourists, adaptive 
tourists and conformity tourists. And the density variable 
of scenic spot managers is introduced as well. This 
research simulates the evolution process of self-decisions 
of tourists to conduct not-deviant behavior or deviant 
behavior according to their surrounding environment 
status, and adjust the appropriate value through changing 
decision variable value, and dig out the problem of 
optimizing deviant tourist behavior, and finally reveal 
the optimization strategies of deviant tourist behavior. 
Through simulation, the following strategies are proposed 
to optimize deviant tourist behavior.
On the one hand, appropriately set the density of scenic 
spot managers to constrain the outbreak of deviant tourist 
behavior. The conclusions of simulation study show that 
the optimization density ratio of scenic spot managers 
should not be less than 4% (when the density of tourists is 
60%). The ratio of scenic spot managers directly concerns 
the breakout peak value, latency time and emerging 
frequency of deviant tourist behavior. In the system of 
a scenic spot, increasing the density ratio of scenic spot 
managers can increase the expected cost of deviant tourist 
behavior, and reduce the peak value of outbreak, latency 
time and emerging frequency of deviant behavior to 
restrain the outbreak of the large scale of deviant tourist 
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behavior. A scenic spot needs to properly set the density 
of scenic spot managers, establish and improve the system 
of deviant tourist behavior “blacklist” and punishment 
system. These lists and rules should be open to the whole 
society, and accept social supervision and cultivate the 
tourists’ knowledge to conduct civilized behavior, and 
also provides evidence for scenic spot managers to give 
warnings or punishments. 
On the other hand, create civilized environment of 
scenic areas and guide the conformity thinking of tourists 
so as to promote the consistency of civilized behavior of 
the group. Analysis of conformity preferences has proved 
that in the situation of more initial civilized tourists, in 
the group of tourists without conformity behavior, deviant 
tourists present a right-skewed distribution and larger 
peak value of outbreak. And a certain ratio of conformity 
group could reduce the peak value of outbreak of 
deviant behavior. Deviant behavior in conformity group 
sharply declines to 9, which shows on the condition that 
initial civilized behavior is the choice of most tourists, 
conformity behavior can promote the group consistency 
and advance the generation of civilized behavior 
strategies. Therefore, a scenic spot needs to create 
civilized environment of scenic areas and properly guide 
the conformity thinking of tourists to conduct civilized 
behavior, increase the number and ratio of civilized 
tourists. Only in this way, can civilized behavior subtly be 
the optimization strategy choice of tourists. 
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APPENDIX 1 PROCEDURE FOR SILULATION EXPERIMENT 1, 2, AND 3
breed [independent-agents independent-agent]
breed [adaptive-agents adaptive-agent]
breed [conformity-agents conformity-agent]
breed [personnel a-personnel]
globals [
   k  ; factor for determining probability of being caught
   threshold ; by how much must EU >E C to make someone deviant?
]
independent-agents-own [
   reputation-cost          ; R, ranging from 0-1 (inclusive)
   Motivation               ; M, also ranging from 0-1 (inclusive)
   deviant?               ; if true, then the tourist commit deviant behaviors
   punishment-term ; how many turns in punishment remain? (if 0, the agent is not in punishment)
]
adaptive-agents-own [
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   reputation-cost ; R, ranging from 0-1 (inclusive)
   motivation  ; M, also ranging from 0-1 (inclusive)
   deviant?  ; if true, then the tourist commit deviant behaviors
   punishment-term ; how many turns in punishment remain? (if 0, the agent is not in punishment)
]
conformity-agents-own [
   reputation-cost ; R, ranging from 0-1 (inclusive)
   Motivation  ; M, also ranging from 0-1 (inclusive)
   deviant?  ; if true, then the tourist commit deviant behaviors
   punishment-term ; how many turns in punishment remain? (if 0, the agent is not in punishment)
]
patches-own [
   neighborhood ; surrounding patches within the vision radius
]
to setup
   clear-all
   ;; set globals
set k 7
set threshold 0.1
ask patches [
   ;; make background a slightly dark gray
   set pcolor gray - 1
   ;; cache patch neighborhoods
   set neighborhood patches in-radius vision
]
;; create personnel
create-personnel round (initial-personnel-density * .01 * count patches) [
   move-to one-of patches with [not any? turtles-here]
   display-personnel
]
;; create agents
create-independent-agents round (initial-independent-agent-density * .01 * count patches) [
   move-to one-of patches with [not any? turtles-here]
   set heading 0
   set reputation-cost random-float 1.0
   set motivation random-float 1.0
   set deviant? false
   set punishment-term 0
   display-independent-agent
]
      create-adaptive-agents round (initial-adaptive-agent-density * .01 * count patches) [
   move-to one-of patches with [not any? turtles-here]
   set heading 0
   set reputation-cost random-float 1.0
   set motivation random-float 1.0
   set deviant? false
   set punishment-term 0
   display-independent-agent
]
      create-conformity-agents round (initial-conformity-agent-density * .01 * count patches) [
   move-to one-of patches with [not any? turtles-here]
   set heading 0
   set reputation-cost random-float 1.0
   set motivation random-float 1.0
   set deviant? false
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   set punishment-term 0
   display-independent-agent
]
;; start clock and plot initial state of system
   reset-ticks
end
to go
   ask turtles [
      ; Rule M: Move to a random site within your vision
      if (breed = independent-agents and punishment-term = 0) or (breed = adaptive-agents and punishment-term = 0) 
or (breed = conformity-agents and punishment-term = 0) or breed = personnel
[ move ]
;  Rule determine-behavior1, determine-behavior2, determine-behavior3: Determine if each agent should be deviant 
or quiet
if breed = independent-agents and punishment-term = 0 [ determine-behavior1 ]
if breed = adaptive-agents and punishment-term = 0 [ determine-behavior2 ]
if breed = conformity-agents and punishment-term = 0 [ determine-behavior3 ]
; Rule C: Personnel catch a random deviant agent within their radius
if breed = personnel [ enforce ]
]
; punishmented agents get their term reduced at the end of each clock tick
ask independent-agents
   [ if punishment-term > 0 [ set punishment-term punishment-term - 1 ] ]
ask adaptive-agents
   [ if punishment-term > 0 [ set punishment-term punishment-term - 1 ] ]
ask conformity-agents
   [ if punishment-term > 0 [ set punishment-term punishment-term - 1 ] ]
; update agent display
ask independent-agents [ display-independent-agent ]
ask adaptive-agents [ display-adaptive-agent ]
ask conformity-agents [ display-conformity-agent ]
ask personnel [ display-personnel ]
; advance clock and update plots
tick
end
;; AGENT AND PERSONNEL BEHAVIOR
;; move to an empty patch
to move ;; turtle procedure
if movement? or (breed = personnel) [
   ;; move to a patch in vision; candidate patches are
   ;; empty or contain only punishmented agents
   let targets neighborhood with
         [not any? personnel-here and all? independent-agents-here [punishment-term > 0] and all? adaptive-agents-here 
[punishment-term > 0] and all? conformity-agents-here [punishment-term > 0]]
   if any? targets [ move-to one-of targets ]
]
end
;; AGENT BEHAVIOR
to determine-behavior1
   set deviant? (expected-utility - reputation-cost * estimated-caught-probability > threshold)
end
to-report expected-utility
   report motivation * (1 - perceived-awareness)
end
to-report estimated-caught-probability
   let C count personnel-on neighborhood
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let A 1 + count (independent-agents-on neighborhood) with [deviant?] + count (adaptive-agents-on neighborhood) 
with [deviant?] + count (conformity-agents-on neighborhood) with [deviant?]
;; See Info tab for a discussion of the following formula
report 1 - exp (- k * floor (C / A))
end
to determine-behavior2
set deviant? (expected-utility - reputation-cost * estimated-caught-probability > threshold and conformity-value 
= 0) or (expected-utility - reputation-cost * estimated-caught-probability > threshold and conformity-value > 0 
and conformity-value > 0.5) or (expected-utility - reputation-cost * estimated-caught-probability <= threshold and 
conformity-value < 1 and conformity-value > 0.5)
end
to determine-behavior3
   set deviant? (conformity-value > 0.5)
end
to-report conformity-value
   let DN count (independent-agents-on neighborhood) with [deviant?] + count (adaptive-agents-on neighborhood) 
with [deviant?] + count (conformity-agents-on neighborhood) with [deviant?]
   let TN count independent-agents-on neighborhood + count adaptive-agents-on neighborhood + count conformity-
agents-on neighborhood
   report DN / TN
end
;; COP BEHAVIOR
to enforce
if any? (independent-agents-on neighborhood) with [deviant?][
   ;; arrest suspect
   let suspect one-of (independent-agents-on neighborhood) with [deviant?]
   ask suspect[
      set deviant? false
      set punishment-term random max-punishment-term
]
move-to suspect ;; move to patch of the punishment agent
]
if any? (adaptive-agents-on neighborhood) with [deviant?][
   ;; arrest suspect
   let suspect one-of (adaptive-agents-on neighborhood) with [deviant?]
   ask suspect[
      set deviant? false
      set punishment-term random max-punishment-term
   ]
move-to suspect ;; move to patch of the punishment agent
]if any? (conformity-agents-on neighborhood) with [deviant?][
   ;; arrest suspect
   let suspect one-of (conformity-agents-on neighborhood) with [deviant?]
   ask suspect[
      set deviant? false
      set punishment-term random max-punishment-term
   ]
move-to suspect ;; move to patch of the punishment agent
   ]
end
;; VISUALIZATION OF AGENTS AND COPS
to display-independent-agent ;; agent procedure
   ifelse visualization = “2D”
      [ display-independent-agent-2D ]
      [ display-independent-agent-3D ]
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End
to display-adaptive-agent ;; agent procedure
   ifelse visualization = “2D”
      [ display-adaptive-agent-2D ]
      [ display-adaptive-agent-3D ]
end
to display-conformity-agent ;; agent procedure
   ifelse visualization = “2D”
      [ display-conformity-agent-2D ]
      [ display-conformity-agent-3D ]
end
to display-independent-agent-2D ;; agent procedure
   set shape “circle”
   ifelse deviant?
      [ set color red ]
      [ ifelse punishment-term > 0
         [ set color black + 3 ]
[ set color scale-color green motivation 1.5 -0.5 ] ]
End
to display-adaptive-agent-2D ;; agent procedure
   set shape “square”
   ifelse deviant?
      [ set color orange ]
      [ ifelse punishment-term > 0
         [ set color gray + 3 ]
[ set color scale-color blue motivation 1.5 -0.5 ] ]
end
to display-conformity-agent-2D ;; agent procedure
   set shape “pentagon”
   ifelse deviant?
      [ set color pink ]
      [ ifelse punishment-term > 0
         [ set color brown + 3 ]
         [ set color scale-color violet motivation 1.5 -0.5 ] ]
end
to display-independent-agent-3D ;; agent procedure
set color scale-color green motivation 1.5 -0.5
ifelse deviant?
   [ set shape “person active” ]
   [ ifelse punishment-term > 0
      [ set shape “person jailed” ]
      [ set shape “person quiet” ] ]
end
to display-adaptive-agent-3D ;; agent procedure
   set color scale-color blue motivation 1.5 -0.5
   ifelse deviant?
      [ set shape “person active” ]
      [ ifelse punishment-term > 0
         [ set shape “person jailed” ]
         [ set shape “person quiet” ] ]
end
to display-conformity-agent-3D ;; agent procedure
   set color scale-color violet motivation 1.5 -0.5
   ifelse deviant?
      [ set shape “person active” ]
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      [ ifelse punishment-term > 0
         [ set shape “person jailed” ]
         [ set shape “person quiet” ] ]
end
to display-personnel
   set color cyan
   ifelse visualization = “2D”
      [ set shape “triangle” ]
      [ set shape “person soldier” ]
end
APPENDIX 2 PROCEDURE FOR SILULATION EXPERIMENT 4,5, AND 6
breed [independent-agents independent-agent]
breed [adaptive-agents adaptive-agent]
breed [conformity-agents conformity-agent]
breed [personnel a-personnel]
globals [
   k  ; factor for determining probability of being caught
   threshold ; by how much must EU >E C to make someone deviant?
]
independent-agents-own [
   reputation-cost ; R, ranging from 0-1 (inclusive)
   Motivation  ; M, also ranging from 0-1 (inclusive)
   deviant?  ; if true, then the tourist commit deviant behaviors
   punishment-term ; how many turns in punishment remain? (if 0, the agent is not in punishment)
]
adaptive-agents-own [
   reputation-cost ; R, ranging from 0-1 (inclusive)
   motivation  ; M, also ranging from 0-1 (inclusive)
   deviant?  ; if true, then the tourist commit deviant behaviors
   punishment-term ; how many turns in punishment remain? (if 0, the agent is not in punishment)
]
conformity-agents-own [
   reputation-cost ; R, ranging from 0-1 (inclusive)
   Motivation  ; M, also ranging from 0-1 (inclusive)
   deviant?  ; if true, then the tourist commit deviant behaviors
   punishment-term ; how many turns in punishment remain? (if 0, the agent is not in punishment)
]
patches-own [
   neighborhood ; surrounding patches within the vision radius
]
to setup
   clear-all
   ;; set globals
   set k 7
   set threshold 0.1
ask patches [
   ;; make background a slightly dark gray
   set pcolor gray - 1
   ;; cache patch neighborhoods
   set neighborhood patches in-radius vision
]
;; create personnel
create-personnel round (initial-personnel-density * .01 * count patches) [
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   move-to one-of patches with [not any? turtles-here]
   display-personnel   
]
;; create agents
   create-independent-agents round (initial-independent-agent-density * .01 * count patches) [
   move-to one-of patches with [not any? turtles-here]
   set heading 0
   set reputation-cost random-float 1.0
   set motivation random-float 1.0
   set deviant? (random 100 < 20)
   set punishment-term 0
   display-independent-agent
]
   create-adaptive-agents round (initial-adaptive-agent-density * .01 * count patches) [
   move-to one-of patches with [not any? turtles-here]
   set heading 0
   set reputation-cost random-float 1.0
   set motivation random-float 1.0
   set deviant? (random 100 < 20)
   set punishment-term 0
   display-independent-agent
]
      create-conformity-agents round (initial-conformity-agent-density * .01 * count patches) [
   move-to one-of patches with [not any? turtles-here]
   set heading 0
   set reputation-cost random-float 1.0
   set motivation random-float 1.0
   set deviant? (random 100 < 20)
   set punishment-term 0
   display-independent-agent
]
;; start clock and plot initial state of system
reset-ticks
end
to go
   ask turtles [
      ; Rule M: Move to a random site within your vision
      if (breed = independent-agents and punishment-term = 0) or (breed = adaptive-agents and punishment-term = 0) 
or (breed = conformity-agents and punishment-term = 0) or breed = personnel
   [ move ]
   ;  Rule determine-behavior1, determine-behavior2, determine-behavior3: Determine if each agent should be 
deviant or quiet
if breed = independent-agents and punishment-term = 0 [ determine-behavior1 ]
if breed = adaptive-agents and punishment-term = 0 [ determine-behavior2 ]
if breed = conformity-agents and punishment-term = 0 [ determine-behavior3 ]
   ; Rule C: Personnel catch a random deviant agent within their radius
   if breed = personnel [ enforce ]
]
; punishmented agents get their term reduced at the end of each clock tick
ask independent-agents
[ if punishment-term > 0 [ set punishment-term punishment-term - 1 ] ]
ask adaptive-agents
   [ if punishment-term > 0 [ set punishment-term punishment-term - 1 ] ]
   ask conformity-agents
   [ if punishment-term > 0 [ set punishment-term punishment-term - 1 ] ]
39 Copyright © Canadian Research & Development Center of Sciences and Cultures
YANG Lei; LUO Shihui (2018). 
Management Science and Engineering, 12(1), 22-41
; update agent display
ask independent-agents [ display-independent-agent ]
ask adaptive-agents [ display-adaptive-agent ]
ask conformity-agents [ display-conformity-agent ]
ask personnel [ display-personnel ]
; advance clock and update plots
tick
end
;; AGENT AND PERSONNEL BEHAVIOR
;; move to an empty patch
to move ;; turtle procedure
   if movement? or (breed = personnel) [
      ;; move to a patch in vision; candidate patches are
      ;; empty or contain only punishmented agents
      let targets neighborhood with
         [not any? personnel-here and all? independent-agents-here [punishment-term > 0] and all? adaptive-agents-here 
[punishment-term > 0] and all? conformity-agents-here [punishment-term > 0]]
if any? targets [ move-to one-of targets ]
]
end
;; AGENT BEHAVIOR
to determine-behavior1
   set deviant? (expected-utility - reputation-cost * estimated-caught-probability > threshold)
end
to-report expected-utility
   report motivation * (1 - perceived-awareness)
end
to-report estimated-caught-probability
   let C count personnel-on neighborhood
   let A 1 + count (independent-agents-on neighborhood) with [deviant?] + count (adaptive-agents-on neighborhood) 
with [deviant?] + count (conformity-agents-on neighborhood) with [deviant?]
;; See Info tab for a discussion of the following formula
report 1 - exp (- k * floor (C / A))
end
to determine-behavior2
   set deviant? (expected-utility - reputation-cost * estimated-caught-probability > threshold and conformity-
value = 0) or (expected-utility - reputation-cost * estimated-caught-probability > threshold and conformity-value > 
0 and conformity-value > 0.5) or (expected-utility - reputation-cost * estimated-caught-probability <= threshold and 
conformity-value < 1 and conformity-value > 0.5)
end
to determine-behavior3
   set deviant? (conformity-value > 0.5)
end
to-report conformity-value
   let DN count (independent-agents-on neighborhood) with [deviant?] + count (adaptive-agents-on neighborhood) 
with [deviant?] + count (conformity-agents-on neighborhood) with [deviant?]
let TN count independent-agents-on neighborhood + count adaptive-agents-on neighborhood + count conformity-
agents-on neighborhood
report DN / TN
end
;; COP BEHAVIOR
to enforce
if any? (independent-agents-on neighborhood) with [deviant?][
   ;; arrest suspect
   let suspect one-of (independent-agents-on neighborhood) with [deviant?]
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   ask suspect[
   set deviant? false
      set punishment-term random max-punishment-term
   ]
   move-to suspect ;; move to patch of the punishment agent
]
if any? (adaptive-agents-on neighborhood) with [deviant?][
;; arrest suspect
let suspect one-of (adaptive-agents-on neighborhood) with [deviant?]
ask suspect[
   set deviant? false
   set punishment-term random max-punishment-term
]
move-to suspect ;; move to patch of the punishment agent
]if any? (conformity-agents-on neighborhood) with [deviant?][
;; arrest suspect
let suspect one-of (conformity-agents-on neighborhood) with [deviant?]
ask suspect[
      set deviant? false
      set punishment-term random max-punishment-term
   ]
   move-to suspect ;; move to patch of the punishment agent
]
end
;; VISUALIZATION OF AGENTS AND COPS
to display-independent-agent ;; agent procedure
ifelse visualization = “2D”
   [ display-independent-agent-2D ]
   [ display-independent-agent-3D ]
End
to display-adaptive-agent ;; agent procedure
ifelse visualization = “2D”
   [ display-adaptive-agent-2D ]
   [ display-adaptive-agent-3D ]
end
to display-conformity-agent ;; agent procedure
ifelse visualization = “2D”
   [ display-conformity-agent-2D ]
   [ display-conformity-agent-3D ]
end
to display-independent-agent-2D ;; agent procedure
set shape “circle”
ifelse deviant?
   [ set color red ]
   [ ifelse punishment-term > 0
      [ set color black + 3 ]
[ set color scale-color green motivation 1.5 -0.5 ] ]
End
to display-adaptive-agent-2D ;; agent procedure
set shape “square”
ifelse deviant?
   [ set color orange ]
   [ ifelse punishment-term > 0
      [ set color gray + 3 ]
[ set color scale-color blue motivation 1.5 -0.5 ] ]
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end
to display-conformity-agent-2D ;; agent procedure
set shape “pentagon”
ifelse deviant?
   [ set color pink ]
   [ ifelse punishment-term > 0
      [ set color brown + 3 ]
[ set color scale-color violet motivation 1.5 -0.5 ] ]
end
to display-independent-agent-3D ;; agent procedure
set color scale-color green motivation 1.5 -0.5
ifelse deviant?
   [ set shape “person active” ]
   [ ifelse punishment-term > 0
      [ set shape “person jailed” ]
      [ set shape “person quiet” ] ]
end
to display-adaptive-agent-3D ;; agent procedure
set color scale-color blue motivation 1.5 -0.5
ifelse deviant?
   [ set shape “person active” ]
   [ ifelse punishment-term > 0
      [ set shape “person jailed” ]
      [ set shape “person quiet” ] ]
end
to display-conformity-agent-3D ;; agent procedure
set color scale-color violet motivation 1.5 -0.5
ifelse deviant?
   [ set shape “person active” ]
   [ ifelse punishment-term > 0
      [ set shape “person jailed” ]
      [ set shape “person quiet” ] ]
end
to display-personnel
   set color cyan
ifelse visualization = “2D”
   [ set shape “triangle” ]
   [ set shape “person soldier” ]
end
